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# Electricity industry restructuring in Australia

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
# Electricity industry restructuring: a complex design process

- A design process *within a cultural context*:
  - Industry-specific laws, codes & markets
- A mix of technical, economic & policy issues:
  - Physical behaviour continuous & cooperative
  - Commercial behaviour individual & competitive
- Restructuring is still a learning situation:
  - A “social experiment” with few “safe exits”
  - No complete successes, some notable failures
  - Must solve commercial, technical & institutional challenges *to keep the lights on at the right price*

# Key lessons to date (Joskow, May '03):

- Electricity market design:
  - Doesn't matter much when:
    - Demand is moderate, supply elastic, ownership not concentrated & transmission not congested
  - Does matter when this is not the case, eg:
    - Few hours when demand high & network congested
- Key aspects of good market design:
  - (approximate) nodal pricing
  - Derivatives including financial transmission rights
  - Consistent energy and ancillary service markets
  - Retail markets with spot & forward pricing


# The central challenge of electricity restructuring: *to make **economics** & **engineering** compatible*



# Comparison of SMD & Australian National Electricity Market


<b>Standard market design</b>	<b>Australian NEM</b>
Independent RTO	Single independent RTO, ISO & market operator
Day-ahead market with central unit commitment	Ex-ante 5/30 minute market without unit commitment
LMP & FTRs	Hub & spoke LMP & FTRs; Merchant transmission
Resource adequacy requirement	High price cap \$10,000/MWH +10-yr gen & network outlook
No network rate pancaking	No wheeling or pancaking
Market power mitigation	Market power mitigation

# The Australian approach to electricity industry restructuring



# Timeline for electricity trading

(locational detail & active demand-side participation matter)



# Australia: COAG restructuring process

- 1899:
  - Courses on electricity industry restructuring
- 1990-2:
  - COAG agreed to consider reform (1990)
  - Industry Commission report (1991):
    - Poor investment decisions:- excess capacity
    - Excessive staff levels & cross subsidies in pricing
    - *Recommended a competitive 'national grid'*
  - National Grid Management Council formed:
    - Implement COAG policy on electricity restructuring
  - National Grid Protocol, First Issue (Dec 1992)



# Australia: COAG restructuring process

- 1993: NGMC 'Paper trial' of two options:
  - Interconnected regional pools:
    - Including network losses & interconnector flow constraints
  - Centralised commitment, capacity contracts, CFDs
- 1994-98:
  - Competition policy & Trade Practices Act
  - Federal & state-level regulators established
  - Development of National Electricity Code:
    - Trading experiments & training using NEM design from 1995
  - NSW & Victorian markets started '94 & '96; joined in 1997
  - Updated Queensland market started 1997
  - NEM commenced 13 December 1998
- 2002:
  - Council of Australian Governments' energy market review

# COAG Response to the Review

(Ministerial Council on Energy, 11 December 03)


- MCE recommends to COAG the establishment of:
  - A single energy market governance body
  - A new national legislative framework
  - Two new statutory commissions from 1/7/04:  
(electricity & gas markets & networks)
    - Australian Energy Market Commission:
      - Rule making & market development (replacing NECA)
    - Australian Energy Regulator
      - To be constituted as autonomous part of ACCC)
      - Market & network regulation
- National network planning process with apparently less emphasis on merchant transmission

## REGIONAL BOUNDARIES for the NATIONAL ELECTRICITY MARKET


# Scope of the NEM

- Queensland
- New South Wales & ACT
- Victoria
- South Australia
- Tasmania (on connection to the mainland)

NEM regions are indicated, and their boundaries need not be on state borders (e.g. two regions in NSW)




# Current regulatory arrangements



# Key NEM features


- NEM covers all participating states:
  - Hub & spoke approximation to nodal pricing
  - Ancillary services, spot market & projections
  - Derivative trading, including auctions of inter-regional settlement residues (FTRs)
  - State-owned market & system operator: NEMMCO
  - Compulsory participants in NEM:
    - All dispatchable generators & merchant links > 30 MW
    - Network service providers & retailers
- Contestable consumers may buy from NEM

# Electricity industry structure in SE Australia



# NEM regional spot market model

(Based on NEMMCO, 1997)



# Region boundaries & inter-connectors


- Regions boundaries selected so that:
  - Transmission constraints are rare within a region
  - Frequently-occurring constraints are placed on region boundaries
- Region boundaries to be reset as required:
  - Whenever a constraint occurs  $> 50$  hours/year
- An merchant inter-connector is allowed if:
  - dispatchable so that it can bid like a generator:
    - ‘Directlink’ operating since July 2000:
      - 180 MW DC link between NSW & Queensland regions




# Modelling regulated interconnectors & intra-region location

- Regulated interconnector between 2 regions
  - Modelled by a linearised marginal loss function:
    - A ‘dynamic’ network loss factor that depends on flow
    - Flow limits (security or thermal criteria)
- Locational effects within regions
  - Modelled by ‘static’ network loss factors (LFs)
    - Annual average of estimated half-hour marginal losses for each generator node & group of consumer nodes
  - Intra-regional constraints not modelled but a ‘constrained-on’ generator cannot set price

# NEM processes for managing supply-demand balance




# NEM Pre-dispatch, Dispatch & AGC



# Dispatch, Pre-dispatch, PASA & SOO

(source: NEMMCO)




**Statement of opportunities (SOO)** is intended to inform generation and network investment decisions (10 year horizon, yearly update)

**Medium term projection of system adequacy (PASA)** is intended to inform near-term reliability assessment and reserve trader process (2 yr horizon, weekly update)

# PASA & reserve trader

(long term expected USE < 0.002%)



# Derivative trading in support of NEM


- Trading in swap & cap contracts:
  - Bilateral trading
  - Over-the-counter instruments
  - Exchange-traded CFDs (swaps)
- Inter-regional hedges:
  - Specialised form of financial instrument:
    - to manage regional price difference risks
    - funded by interconnector settlement residues
  - NEMMCO inter-regional settlement residue auctions:
    - Commenced in 1999

# Key derivative markets

- Forward contracts (futures)
  - Expected spot price for a defined load shape & period (eg flat annual demand)
  - Either OTC or exchange traded
- Call options
- Renewable energy certificates
  - Available to qualifying generators
  - Increasing to 9,500 GWH pa at 2010 then constant to 2020

# Reducing generation to raise spot market price


(graph courtesy of Intelligent Energy Systems EMIS facility)







# Demand side response to high spot price: NEM Victorian region, 8/2/01 (NECA, 2001)

(note: derivative contract cover usually high)




# Cumulative spot price duration curve, NSW

## July-September 2003 (NECA, 03Q3 Stats, 2003)




# Running weekly accumulation of (336) RRP's & cumulative price threshold (CPT)

(NECA, 03Q2 Stats, 2003)




# Smoothed NEM Regional Ref Prices (RRPs) since market inception (NECA, 03Q3 Stats, 2003)




# NEM quarterly spot price volatility

(range of central 75% of spot prices divided by median)  
(NECA, 03Q3 Stats, 2003)




# Average one-year flat contract prices

(NECA, 03Q3 Stats, 2003)



UNSW

Queensland




Call option premiums for Qld & NSW

Marginal price = strike price (Tavis, 2003)

Marginal Cost (\$ per MWh)

2000-01 2001-02 2002-03


New South Wales



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# SOO: Projected gen'n & summer peak demand


(Medium growth + extreme weather: NEMMCO SOO, July 03)





# SOO: Projected surplus reserves NEM states

(Medium growth + extreme (10% POE) weather, NEMMCO SOO, July 03)



# Four key messages (NEMMCO SOO, July 03)

## 1. Demand growth

***Strong in NSW and Queensland  
1000-1400 MW a year NEM-wide***

## 2. Reserves declining

***NEM-wide decline in reserves due  
to demand***


## 3. Investment required

***“Needle peaks” impact on mix of  
base load - peaking - demand side***

## 4. Interconnection

***Will not by itself help supply-  
demand balance beyond 2005-06***

# Advanced or publicly announced generation projects by fuel type & compared to expected reserve deficit in 2008/09



# Potential market design enhancements

- AS, spot & derivative market issues (NEM & retail):
  - Potential to improve FCAS & NCAS arrangements
  - Boundary between FCAS & 5/30 minute spot market
  - More market regions to improve network representation
  - Monopoly derivative market compatible with spot market
  - Interval meters that record availability & quality of supply
  - Spot & forward retail tariffs that include FCAS & NCAS
- Network services:
  - Spot & forward network service tariffs that include NCAS
  - Resolve conflict between merchant & regulated network services
- Sustainability:
  - Emission taxes/permits plus support for innovation

# Conclusions: Australian restructuring

- Strengths of Aust. electricity restructuring:
  - Efficient dispatch of existing large generation
  - Sound 10-year start to the transition process
- Weaknesses of Aust. electricity restructuring:
  - State-level governance & ownership issues
  - Inadequate environmental outcomes
  - Regulated vs unregulated network services
  - Inadequate signals for distributed resources
  - Room for improvement in market design:
    - Ancillary service, spot & derivatives, network services
    - Compatible retail market design & metering